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Theoretical analyses of the effects of works councils show ambiguous results. 
Therefore an empirical investigation of the issue is inevitable. The results so 
far are mixed, frequently a positive effect on productivity, but a negative one on 
profits is found. The problem of both theoretical and empirical studies is the 
assumption of firm homogeneity. To close this gap, we take into account firm 
heterogeneity proxied by the percentage of highly qualified employees in the 
workforce. The theoretical result that the positive productivity effect is more 
pronounced in firms with well-defined majorities is confirmed in the empirical 
part of the paper. The results on profitability are less favourable for works 
councils: in those firms where the productivity effect is significant, the 
profitability effect is negative, except for firms with a very high percentage of 
highly qualified employees. Turning to the effect of collective agreements, they 
seem to mitigate the problem of reduced profitability in firms with no clear 
majority in the structure of qualifications. 
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"Works Councils and Heterogeneous Firms" 
 





The German history of codetermination via works councils in today’s form 
dates back to the codetermination laws of either 1952 or 1972. The latest 
major modifications were applied in 2001. From an economist’s point of view 
there are two interconnected questions. First of all, why is it necessary to 
regulate industrial relations by law and secondly, what are the effects of these 
laws? Section II of this paper will give an overview of the answers to these 
questions according to the literature. When applying laws it is not possible to 
consider firm specific situations beyond a certain extend. Theoretical as well 
as empirical research has not taken firm heterogeneity and different interest 
groups of employees into account to a satisfactory extent so far. Yet, it is 
unlikely that the situation of all firms and all employees is homogeneous. In 
Section III of this paper, we will extend a theoretical model analysing the case 
for mandatory codetermination considering heterogeneity. Section IV will test 
these implications empirically, while firm heterogeneity is measured by the 
percentage of highly qualified employees in the workforce. Section V will give 
conclusions and an outlook on the effects of structural changes. 
 
II. Literature  review 
 
There are mainly two theoretical lines of arguments evaluating the effects of 
works councils. These are the property-rights-theory and the participation-
theory, which reveal different results.
1 Arguments against codetermination are 
found especially in the property-rights-theory: codetermination weakens the 
residual decision rights of employers or owners and leads to less efficient 
                                            
1   For an overview see especially Dilger (2003).   2
decisions. This results in lower productivity or at least in fewer profits for the 
owners, as the employees are able to reap some of the profits. On the other 
hand, the participation-theory suggests that codetermination favours the voice 
against the exit option and leads to higher productivity. According to Jensen 
and Meckling (1979, p. 474), it is not necessary to find out which theory is true: 
if codetermination was beneficiary to the firm, the owners or employers would 
introduce it voluntarily. However, as in countries without codetermination laws 
no voluntarily introduced works councils are found, they are not efficient 
according to this reasoning.
2 Nevertheless, there are some reasons why an 
efficient institution may not emerge from a free market for industrial relations. 
These are mainly that allocation and distribution may not be separated and 
that the usual market failure arguments hold: external effects, public goods 
and information asymmetries.
3
  Since the question of the effects of works 
councils is not to be determined theoretically, empirical estimation is 
necessary.  
Although there are some empirical problems estimating these effects, the 
major difficulty is diminishing: getting a representative data-set. With the IAB-
Establishment Panel
4, a broad data base is available for the researcher. Table 
1 presents an overview of current studies concerning the effects of works 
councils using this panel. 
                                            
2   Although there are quite a lot of other participatory elements which are implemented 
voluntarily (e.g. Frick 2002a). 
3   See Dilger (2003) or Renaud (2006) for a comprehensive analysis. 
4   See Kölling (2000) for a detailed description of the IAB-Establishment-Panel.   3
Table 1: Empirical publications on works councils’ effects  
Authors Methodology  Years  Results 
Frick (2002b)  OLS, cross-
section 
1998  25-30% higher productivity in 
firms with works council. 




2000  25-30% higher productivity in 
firms with works council. 
Significant reduction of personnel 
fluctuation in firms with works 
council, especially when firm is 
bound to a collective agreement. 







Positive productivity effects of 
works councils’ presence 
 











Significant positive effects of 
works councils in pooled cross-
sections, but not very robust in 
single-year cross-sections. 
No significant effects of works 
councils on productivity-growth.  









Significant negative effect of 
works councils on employment 
growth. 









No significant effects of works 
councils on productivity. 







No significant differences in 
personnel fluctuations, 
productivity, employment and 
profits between matched firms 
with and without works council. 








Significant positive effect of works 
councils on plant closings except 
for a sub-sample of small firms 
with collective agreement. 








No (robust) significant effects of 
works council formation or 
dissolution on investment.   4
To sum up, the results so far are ambiguous. Thus, neither the proponents, nor 
the critics of the firm-level-codetermination have the empirical evidence on 
their side. Unfortunately, it is not yet possible to examine the long term effects 
of works councils, as the IAB-Panel did not exist before 1996 for Germany (or 
1993 for the Western part). 
 
III.  Theoretical considerations concerning works councils and firm 
heterogeneity 
 
A model, introduced by Freeman and Lazear (1995, pp. 29) gives a concise 
overview of some of the reasons why codetermination laws may be necessary: 
Productivity or the cooperation-rent increases with the degree of works 
councils’ rights up to a certain point (C* in Figure 1). Although the aggregate 
rent is increasing, the share of the employers (the part below RER in Figure 1) 
peaks with lower codetermination rights (CER), because with higher 
codetermination rights, the employees are able to reap an increasing part of 
the rent (the part between Raggr. and RER). Therefore the optimal degree of 
codetermination for the employees peaks at CEE (where the slope of Raggr. and 
RER is equivalent). Codetermination in an optimal allocational sense may not 
be introduced, a special law may be necessary to maximize welfare at C
*.
5  
                                            
5   Implicitly, this model is static and assumes a closed economy. We will turn to this later.   5
Figure 1: The rent-sharing model 
 
This reveals the first empirically testable implication: If the codetermination law 
is somewhere near C
*, the firm’s profits should be lower and its productivity 
higher than in firms without a mandatory works council. Firm profits in the case 
of a works council may be higher (but not necessarily) than in the case of no 
codetermination at all (0). However, the relevant point of comparison is CER, 
because it is rational for firms to introduce the profit-maximising amount of 
codetermination (CER), except that there are other reasons of market-failure.
6 If 
there are no productivity increasing effects of codetermination at all, a works 
council will necessarily lead to lower profits. If the law is near point CEE, i.e. 
there are very extensive codetermination rights, the qualitative empirical result 
would be similar to point C
* (higher productivity and lower profits compared to 
no codetermination law). Though, the productivity effects may also be negative 
compared to voluntary codetermination. If the law is near point CER (or below 
this point), there will be no effects on productivity and profitability as this is the 
amount of codetermination the firms will introduce voluntarily. This leads us to 
Hypothesis 1: If the codetermination law goes beyond voluntary 
codetermination, a negative effect on profitability is expected. 
                                            
6   See Dilger (2003) for an overview. 
R 
C  C
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0   6
Furthermore, there may be a positive effect on productivity in firms with 
a works council compared to its council-free counterparts. 
 
Deviating from the assumption of the previous model, which assumes 
homogeneous effects across firms, the situation may be different depending 
on size, industry sector, employment structure, organizational structure etc. 
(Renaud 2006, Addison et al. 2000). The situation may look as in Figure 2. 
While the law may lead to a welfare maximum in firm 1, it may not in firm 2, 
although the situation in this firm favours employees because their rent is 
maximised. The reason to be tested here empirically is that in firms with a 
workforce “divided” between highly qualified employees and lowly qualified 
workers, the works councils either may not lead to significant productivity 
increases as they may not be an appropriate voice vehicle for all employees, 
or they may not have a quorum to decide efficiently. This view is consistent 
with Freeman and Lazear’s (1995, pp. 39) argument that the efficiency of the 
works council’s decisions is reduced if there is no clear majority. The 
productivity effect is reduced or even turns negative. On the other hand, it may 
be that in those companies there still persists rent-seeking by the works 
councils as they have certain rights guaranteed by law. This behaviour leads to 
lower profitability in these firms – or the profitability is simply reduced by the 
lower productivity. The situation of a company with a homogeneous structure 
of employees may look as in firm 1, while a firm with a divided workforce may 
be represented by firm 2. There are two other theoretical possibilities in the 
case of heterogeneity: Firstly, there may be no effects on productivity or 
profitability due to a lack of clear majorities in the works council and its inability 
to pursue rent-seeking (meaning both lines in firm 2 are horizontal). Secondly, 
there may be no productivity effect and still rent-seeking effects due to the 
power given to the council by the law (meaning the Raggr-line to be horizontal 
while RER is the same as in firm 2). Although the heterogeneity effects are not 
completely clear, theory suggests a U-shaped relationship of the effects of 
codetermination laws on productivity across firms differing in qualification 
structure. These effects are present in firms with a high and a low share of 
qualified workers, meaning homogeneity. The profitability effects are less   7
obvious as the effect may be greater for heterogeneous firms if there is still 
rent-seeking but no productivity effect. On the other hand, there may be no 
effect because a divided workforce cannot pursue rent-seeking effectively. 
This leads us to 
Hypothesis 2: When considering the structure of the workforce, there is a 
U-shaped effect of the codetermination law on productivity: (positive) 
productivity effects are particularly high in firms with a clear majority of 
either highly or lowly qualified workers. The effect on profitability is 
negative for a homogeneous workforce, while it is indeterminate in the 
heterogeneous case. 
 
Figure 2: Firm heterogeneity 
 
Works councils are only one part of the German system of industrial relations. 
There may be an important interaction effect, because works councils are not 
allowed to negotiate on issues which are part of collective agreements 
between unions and the employers’ associations (or the companies). This 














Raggr.   8
reduced (negative) profitability effect of works councils as rent-seeking is kept 
out of the firm (Freeman and Lazear 1995, p. 32).
7  
Hypothesis 3: The profitability effect of works councils should be lower 
in firms where a collective agreement deals with distributional issues. 
 
IV. Empirical  Evidence 
 
The theoretical considerations from section III imply that the effects of works 
councils differ from firm to firm. Our empirical strategy is to test the effects of 
works councils in groups of firms, differing in the share of highly qualified 
employees in the workforce. Although there are codetermination laws, this is 
possible because works councils are not mandatory: a works council has to be 
introduced only on the employees’ request. This provides the possibility to 
compare firms with and without a works council.
8 
The database we use contains only firms with 21-100 employees for two 
reasons: first of all, smaller firms almost never have a works council, while 
larger firms almost always do. In our sample, about one third of all firms have a 
works council so any bias is less likely. The second reason is that in this range 
of employees, the works council’s rights are fixed, while with larger firms their 
rights increase. We pooled data from 2000-2004, however we did not exploit 
the panel structure of the data. It would be useful to apply fixed-effects 
estimation, but as the works council presence is nearly time invariant, the 
effect would be driven by those few firms that introduced or abandoned a 
works council in those years.
9 
To test the hypotheses, we first estimate a translog production function
10. 
Compared to Cobb-Douglas or CES-functions (which are special cases of it), it 
                                            
7   Although de-jure influence of works councils on pay-schemes etc. bargained in 
collective agreement is limited by §77,3 BetrVG in all firms (even when it is not 
member of the employer’s association). 
8   On the other hand, this may cause a problem of endogeneity of the works council if its 
presence is not random. Unfortunately, it is hardly possible to use treatment-effect 
techniques, as the formation or dissolution of a works council is nearly not existent in 
the sample (Addison et al. 2004a, pp. 410 ff) and especially in the subsamples. See 
also Addison et at. (2003, pp. 668) for the endogeneity problem. 
9   See Addison et al. (2003) for details. 
10   See e.g. Frick (2002b) or Frick and Möller (2003) for details.   9
has the advantage of making no specific assumptions on returns-to-scale or 
substitution elasticities. The general form is lnY = f(lnL,lnC) with capital and 
labour as production factors. Its testable form (after Taylor-approximation) in 
our context is: 









3 2 1 0  
Our output-measure is total sales, although physical output or value added 
would be better measures. As physical output is not available in the panel, and 
value added is difficult to calculate, we decided to use sales according to 
Addison et al. (2003, p. 13). Labour input is proxied by the number of 
employees; capital is proxied by the re-investment average of the base year 
and the year before. Additional control variables, available in the IAB-Panel, 
are the state of production-facilities (index from 1 (state of the art status) to 5 
(completely out of date)), the export-quota as a proxy of international 
competitiveness or pressure, the share of highly qualified employees (white-
collar workers for qualified work, executives, firm-owners), the share of part-
time workers, the share of apprentices, a dummy which takes the value 1 if the 
firm is a stand-alone firm (not a branch plant), a dummy which takes the value 
1 if the firm invested in information- and communication-technology, and 
finally, the dummy which takes the value of 1 if a works council is present in 
the firm.  
 
Testing hypothesis 1 
The results for the sample of all firms, testing hypothesis 1, are presented in 
Table 2.   10
Table 2: OLS-regression of the productivity effects – all firms 
Dependent variable: ln sales  
Independent Variables  Coefficient (p-value) 
ln Capital  -0,280 (0,000)*** 
ln Employees  1,386 (0,000)*** 
ln Capital
2  0,019 (0,000)*** 
ln Employees
2 -0,054  (0,000) 
ln Emloyees * ln Capital  -0,006 (0,194) 
State of production-facilities  -0,031 (0,003)*** 
Export-quota 0,006  (0,000)*** 
Share of high-qualified employees 0,007  (0,000)*** 
Share of part-time workers  -0,009 (0,000)*** 
Share of apprentices   -0,006 (0,000)*** 
Dummy standalone-firm  -0,211 (0,000)*** 
Dummy investment in new technologies 0,061  (0,000)*** 
Dummy works council presence  0,142 (0,000)*** 
Constant: yes   
Year dummies: yes   
41 industry dummies: yes   
adj. R
2 = 0,621   
N = 7120   
***, ** significant at the 1% or 5% level. 
Source: IAB-Establishment Panel, Waves 8 - 12, controlled remote data 
access via the Research Data Center (FDZ) of the Federal Employment 
Service (BA) in the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) 
 
These results are similar to some of those presented in Table 1: the presence 
of a works council increases the productivity. This effect is statistically 
significant at conventional levels. The control variables are significant and their 
signs of the expected direction. The technology-parameters (coefficients of the 
production function) do not reveal much separately.
11  
The second indicator of firm performance is profitability. The theoretical 
considerations imply that it is lower due to rent-seeking activities by 
                                            
11   See e.g. Addison et al. (2003) for construction of the output-elasticities.   11
employees. The IAB-Panel, unfortunately, does not provide firm profits in 
numbers, but in an index from 1 (very good) to 5 (insufficient). We chose 
Ordered-Probit estimation as an appropriate procedure to take this into 
account. Independent variables are the number of employees as a proxy for 
firm-size (and its square to check for non-linearity), the state of production-
facilities, export-quota, percentage of highly qualified employees and the 
works-council dummy as above. Additionally, we check for an effect of 
collective agreements by a dummy which takes the value of one if a firm-level 
or sectoral-level collective agreement applies to the firm. The results for the 
sample of all firms are given in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Ordered-Probit-regression of the profitability-effects – all firms 
Dependent variable: profits (index from 1 = good to 5 = insufficient) 
Independent Variables  Coefficient (p-value) 
Employees 0,003  (0,330) 
Employees
2 -2,145E-0,5  (0,427) 
State of production facilities
  0,172 (0,000)*** 
Collective agreement  0,044 (0,112) 
Export-quota -0,004  (0,000)*** 
Share of high-qualified employees -0,001  (0,328) 
Dummy works council presence  0,110 (0,000)*** 
Constant: yes   
Year dummies: yes   
41 industry dummies: yes   
Pseudo-R
2: Cox and Snell = 0,067   
                   Nagelkerke = 0,071   
                   McFadden = 0,024   
N = 7969   
***, ** significant at the 1% or 5% level. 
Source: IAB-Establishment Panel, Waves 8 - 12 (controlled remote data 
access via FDZ) 
   12
As the theoretical considerations imply, the works council effect on profits is 
negative (note that in this case a positive coefficient indicates a negative effect 
of the variable on profits due to the construction of the index). Interestingly, 
there seems to be no effect of collective bargaining. This may be caused by 
the fact that although most employers and employees are neither member of 
an employer’s association nor a union, most of the German wages are 
influenced by collective agreements (Möschel et al. 2005). Thus it is not 
surprising that there are no significant differences between firms with and 
without a collective agreement. The state of production facilities and the export 
quota are statistically significant and the signs are as expected. The share of 
high-qualified employees, and the firm’s size (number of employees) have no 
effect. The empirical results so far are in favour of hypothesis 1. 
 
Testing hypothesis 2 
Now we turn to heterogeneity in firms, i.e. hypothesis 2: Theoretical 
considerations imply that the positive effects of works councils should be 
smaller in firms with a heterogeneous employment structure. To check this, we 
applied regressions as above but for different sub-samples of firms, 
differentiated by the share of high-qualified employees on the payroll. The 
results for the effects of the works council variable are summarized in Table 4.    13
Table 4: Summary of works council effects on productivity – separated by 
share of highly qualified employees 
Dependent variable: ln sales  
Share of highly 
qualified employees 
Coefficient (p-value)  N, adj. R
2 
0-20% HQ  0,139 (0,000)***  N = 2981; adj R
2 = 0,619 
20-40% HQ  0,122 (0,000)***  N = 1841; adj R
2 = 0,628 
40-60% HQ  0,103 (0,053)  N = 783; adj R
2 = 0,629 
60-80% HQ  0,069 (0,311)  N = 551; adj R
2 = 0,633 
80-100% HQ  0,189 (0,004)***  N = 964; adj R
2 = 0,545 
***, ** significant at the 1% or 5% level. 
Source: IAB-Establishment Panel, Waves 8 - 12 (controlled remote data 
access via FDZ) 
 
Again, the theoretical considerations hold: the positive productivity effects of 
works councils are only present in firms with a low percentage of highly 
qualified employees, while it is insignificant in firms where the workforce is 
“divided” around 50%
12. The positive productivity effect returns for very high 
shares of qualified employees. This result confirms hypothesis 2 on the part of 
the productivity effect.
 13   
We examine the same sub-samples for the question of firm profitability. 
Theoretical considerations in this case are not completely clear. In firms 
without a homogeneous workforce, rent-seeking may be high and therefore 
profits lower, even if there are large positive productivity effects in this case. A 
heterogeneous workforce, on the other hand, may not be able to pursue any 
actions reducing the company’s profits, so the works councils may not have 
any effect at all in those firms. But it may also be possible that, without having 
positive influences on productivity, the groups leading the works councils may 
be able to get personal profits or to prevent profitability-increasing measures 
by firms, reducing firm-profitability. The results are given in Table 5. 
                                            
12   This is especially true for the sub-sample with 60-80% HQ, while the 40-60% group is 
weakly significant if we apply the 10% level of significance.  
13   Though, we have to treat the results with some caution as the number of observations 
is lowest for the insignificant sub-samples.   14
Table 5: Summary of works council effects on profitability – separated by share 
of highly qualified employees 
Dependent variable: profits (index from 1 = good to 5 = insufficient) 
Share of highly 
qualified employees 
Coefficient (p-value)  N, pseudo-R
2 
0-20% HQ  0,144 (0,003)***  N = 3186;  
pseudo-R
2: C&S = 0,080; 
NK = 0,085 ; McF = 0,029 
20-40% HQ  0,147(0,012)**  N = 1951;  
pseudo-R
2: C&S = 0,089; 
NK = 0,094 ; McF = 0,032 
40-60% HQ  0,092 (0,317)  N = 835;  
pseudo-R
2: C&S = 0,138; 
NK = 0,145 ; McF = 0,050 
60-80% HQ  0,199 (0,078)  N = 591;  
pseudo-R
2: C&S = 0,175; 
NK = 0,185 ; McF = 0,064 
80-100% HQ  0,016 (0,847)  N = 1058;  
pseudo-R
2: C&S = 0,084; 
NK = 0,089 ; McF = 0,030 
***, ** significant at the 1% or 5% level. 
Source: IAB-Establishment Panel, Waves 8 - 12 (controlled remote data 
access via FDZ) 
 
The negative profitability effects are only present in firms with lower share of 
highly qualified employees and turn insignificant for the others. While 
productivity increases for those companies, rent-seeking seems to reduce 
profitability. Interestingly, this is not the case for companies with a high share 
of high-qualification employees: while there is a positive productivity effect for 
those firms, there is no negative profitability effect.
14  An interpretation may be 
that highly qualified employees are less interested in rent-seeking. This may 
be due to higher salaries and better employment opportunities for this group, 
compared to lowly qualified workers. For a heterogeneous workforce, the 
theoretical consideration that rent-seeking is difficult when there is no clear 
majority seems to be more likely against the background of the results. 
                                            
14   Only if we apply the 10% level of significance, there is a weakly significant negative 
effect in the sub-sample of 60-80% HQ.   15
Testing hypothesis 3 
Our last investigation concerns the question if profitability is influenced in 
companies with a works council when a collective agreement is present. 
Theoretical considerations imply that in companies where a collective 
agreement is present, there should be a reduced (negative) profitability effect 
of works councils as rent-seeking is kept out of the firm to an increased degree 
(Freeman and Lazear 1995, p. 32). We estimate this by an interaction term 
which takes the value of 1 if the firm has a works council and a collective 
agreement is present. The results for all firms and the subgroups are 
presented in  
Table 6. 
  
Table 6: Summary of interaction of works councils with collective agreements 
Dependent variable: profits (index from 1 = good to 5 = insufficient) 
Share of highly 
qualified employees 
Coefficient (p-value) N, pseudo-R
2 
All firms  -0,061 (0,296)  N = 7621; 
pseudo-R
2: C&S = 0,067; 
NK = 0,071 ; McF = 0,024 
0-20% HQ  -0,027 (0,783)  N = 3186; 
pseudo-R
2: C&S = 0,080; 
NK = 0,085 ; McF = 0,029 
20-40% HQ  0,153 (0,170)  N = 1951; 
pseudo-R
2: C&S = 0,090; 
NK = 0,095 ; McF = 0,033 
40-60% HQ  -0,368 (0,048)**  N = 835; 
pseudo-R
2: C&S = 0,142; 
NK = 0,150 ; McF = 0,052 
60-80% HQ  -0,586 (0,007)***  N = 591; 
pseuro-R
2: C&S = 0,185; 
NK = 0,195; McF = 0,069 
80-100% HQ  0,066 (0,681)  N = 1058; 
pseudo-R
2: C&S = 0,084; 
NK = 0,089 ; McF = 0,030 
***, ** significant at the 1% or 5% level. 
Source: IAB-Establishment Panel, Waves 8 - 12 (controlled remote data 
access via FDZ)   16
 
The results for all firms seem to show no influence of collective bargaining on 
works council effects, rejecting hypothesis 3. However, turning to the 
subgroups, there is a significant positive effect on profitability if there is a 
collective agreement in a firm with a works council in firms with around 50% of 
highly qualified employees. So it seems that the insignificant effect of works 
councils on profitability in those firms is at least supported by a collective 
agreement, although the collective agreement itself has no significant effect on 
its own. This hypothesis is supported by the significant positive coefficient of 
the works councils (meaning reduced profits) in those two estimations
15, which 





The results of the theoretical as well as the empirical analysis show that the 
effect of works councils differs from firm to firm. With a low share of highly 
qualified employees, there is a positive effect of works councils on productivity 
but a negative one on profitability. With an increasing share of highly qualified 
employees, both effects turn insignificant, while the productivity effect returns 
for firms with very high rates. In either case, this reduces the argument for a 
law concerning works councils especially against the background of structural 
changes. Laws cannot consider heterogeneous situations in firms beyond a 
certain degree. In firms with few highly qualified employees, the problem is the 
reduced profitability which may lead to less investment in Germany or 
relocation of firms to other countries. This is particularly relevant as these firms 
face strong international competition and lowly qualified workers are the major 
problem on the German labour-market.
16 With higher rates of highly qualified 
employees, there is either no positive or negative effect at all. Thus works 
councils seem to be pointless. At the same time, the positive productivity effect 
                                            
15   Results not presented here. 
16   See Renaud (2006) for a comprehensive analysis of the structural change in this 
context.   17
in companies with a very high share of highly qualified employees is not 
accompanied by negative profitability effects, which should lead to a voluntary 
implementation of codetermination, at least there should not be much 
resistance by firms (although the law should not do much harm in this case). 
Although it is not yet possible to examine the long-term effects of 
codetermination, structural changes in industrialized countries lead to more 
competition especially among firms with a lower share of highly qualified 
employees and to higher employment of highly qualified workers. This 
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